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IL UNITED STATES LAW
Prior to 1914, unfair competition was governed in the
United States, as in England, by the principles of the common
law. Federal legislation-the law of the individual states will
not be considered here-stated the rules applicable to competition,
through Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,1 with-
out, however, defining the same or declaring concrete examples
as unfair competition falling under the law. The Senate Com-
mission preferred to insert the general statement that "unfair
methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful"
rather than attempt to declare numerous concrete practices as
constituting such, because "there were too many unfair practices
to define and after writing 2o of them into the law, it would
be quite possible to invent others." 2 In regard to the question
of regulation of unfair competition, it was also said:
"There are numerous practices tending towards
monopoly that may not come within the provisions of the
anti-trust law and amount to a monopoly or to monopoliza-
tion. We want to check monopoly in the embryo." 3
An essential purpose of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act 4 was to combat unfair methods of competition. In
order to assure the application of the law to such cases, and to
see it limited to cases of unfair competition which had been dealt
with by the courts before the existence of this law, the expression
"unfair competition", contained in the draft, was changed to
138 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1927).
'Senator Newlands in the Senate debate.
3Ibid.
S pra note i, at 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45.
(854)
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"unfair methods of competition". The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has said that,
. . . freedom of access to the consumer, and the entire
absence of monopoly and non deprivation of the public, have
been regarded as an important element in the decision of
cases of alleged unfair business competition." 5
For this reason the measures forbidden, as in restraint of
trade or as monopoly or an attempt to monopolize, by the Sher-
man 6 and Clayton 7 Acts are considered, on the one hand, as
unfair methods of competition; while, on the other, the measures
expressly allowed by these laws never constitute unfair com-
petition.
A. Boycott and Similar Measures.
Every business man may choose his customers as he pleases
and refuse them for such reasons as he thinks proper." He may,
therefore, refuse such business intercourse as he deems harmful
to his business, and he may condition this business intercourse
on the firm's not selling to his competitors. Even if a number
of firms refuse to deal with a certain customer, about whom they
all have the same opinion, there being, however, no arrangement
or agreement between them, this procedure is fair. Trade boy-
cott is only present when the exclusion of the customer is due to
an agreement, i. e.--combination or conspiracy. If "'exclusive
unity in business is unified and others are kept out of it, except
those who act with the combination, it is a combination'. This
exclusiveness exists by virtue of a restraint of the liberty of
others". 9
'Curtis Publishing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 27o Fed. 88I, 914
(C. C. A. 3d, 1921) ; see also the address of William L. Donovan, assistant to
the Att'y Gen., at the Annual Convention of the National Paint, Oil and Varnish
Ass'n, Inc.: "It is the settled law of this country that public convenience and
welfare demand that the natural lines of competition be left undisturbed and
that the control of prices through combinations tends to restraint of trade and
monopoly and is an evil thing. This principle of competition still remains a
fixed policy of our country. It is when these consolidations attempt to eliminate
competition, to enhance existing prices and to exercise permanent control in the
industry that they constitute violations of the law".
26 STAT. 2oq (i890), i U. S. C., §§ 1-7 (1927).
38 STAT. 730 (914), 15 U. S. C., §§ 12-27 (1927).
8 Clayton Act, supra note 7, at 2og, 15 U. S. C., § 13.
"THORNTON, ComBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT oF TRADE (1928) 373.
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In the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Wholesale
Saddlery Assoc.' 0 an association of wholesale dealers boycotted
the manufacturers who sold to non-members of the wholesale
association, and admitted only wholesalers to the association who
made no retail sales, in order to prevent retailers from buying
directly from the manufacturers. The court confirmed the de-
cree of the Federal Trade Commission, to the effect that such
acts constituted unfair methods of competition in violation of
Section 5 of the Clayton Act."
Exclusive contracts among several firms, cutting off non-
members or persons not parties to the contracts were forbidden,
in principle, by the Sherman Act. They were considered an un-
lawful means to exclude others from the same traffic or business.'
2
The case of Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co.,'" involved
the question of the permissibility of preferred rebates and ex-
clusive-dealing clauses. The company made contracts with its
customers which, considering the amount of merchandise they
were to purchase and the price, were oppressive to them. If,
however, the customer fulfilled his promise to deal exclusively
with the company, the amount of merchandise to be purchased
and the price thereof were reduced to a measure advantageous
to the customer. An action brought by one of the customers
was defeated, and the existence of a boycott against customers
and third parties was denied. It would have been no violation
of the law under consideration if the tobacco company had re-
fusel to sell any of its commodities at any price; much less could
it be a violation of the Act for the defendant to fix its prices too
high for profitable purchase by the plaintiff. In its decision the
Court said:
"0I Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 335 (1919).
n1268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th, 192o). Cf. Fed. Trade Com. v. Raymond
Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565, 44 Sup. Ct. 162 (1924) ; United States v. Brims,
g72 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. i69 (1926) ; Fed. Trade Com. v. Pacific States Paper
Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 255 (927); Western Sugar Refinery
Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., 275 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 9th, i92i) ; American Tobacco
Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., 9 Fed. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE Co]rnIssrow 1927 at 88 and numerous cases cited by
THORNTON, op. cit. smtprc note 9, at 1182, n. 217.
' THORNTON, loc. cit. supra note 9, and cases sited in n. 6 and n. 7 of same.
11125 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o3).
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"The tobacco company and its employ6 sold its products
to customers who refrained from dealing in the goods of
its competitors at prices which rendered their purchases
profitable. But there was no restriction upon competition
here, because this act left the rivals of the tobacco company
free to sell their competing commodities to all other pur-
chasers than those who bought of the defendants, and free
to compete for sales to customers of the tobacco company by
offering to them goods at lower prices or on better terms
than they secured from that company". 14
On the other hand, in the case of Hunt v. Riverside Co-
operative Club, 5 an agreement between the manufacturers and
dealers in plumbers' articles was declared to be void where the
latter obligated themselves to charge non-members a premium of
fifteen to thirty per centum above the regular sale prices. This
was said to be an unlawful combination in restraint of trade.
Preferred rebates are now regulated by Section 2 of the
Clayton Act '6 and the Elkins Anti-rebate Act.17  According to
the former, it is forbidden to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities "where the effect of such discrim-
ination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Turnover rebates
or measures of price policy, undertaken in good faith to meet
competition, are a*llowed.' 8  The Supreme Court has also said in
effect that it is settled law, that a trader or manufacturer engaged
in a private business may sell to whom he pleases, may charge
different prices for the same article to different individuals and
may make such discrimination in his business as he chooses.
This, of course, with the restriction that his contract shall not be
in violation of law, imposed for the protection of the public.'"
The reason that the extending of preferred rebates to faithful
customers is an unfair method of competition lies in the fact that
"'Ibid. at 461.
14o Mich. 538, iO4 N. W. 40 (I9O5).
" Supra note 7, at 730, 15 U. S. C., § 13.
1734 STAT. 587 (19o6), 49 U. S. C., §41 (1927).
's Cf. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1927, at 15.
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 321,
17 Sup. Ct. 540, 551 (1897); Fosburgh v. California, etc., Refining Co., 291
Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); THORNTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 851.
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the discrimination tends to lessen competition or create a
monopoly.
The Elkins Act 20 makes it unlawful to give or to receive
rebates, concessions, or discriminations in respect to the trans-
portation of property in interstate commerce and provides that
one who accepts a rebate must pay treble the amount thereof to
the United States Government by way of penalty.
Although the Supreme Court, in United States v. Koenig
Coal Co.21 had stated the purpose of the law to be "to cut up by
the roots every form of discrimination, favoritism and inequality",
the law, at first, was interpreted as applicable only to common
carriers and shippers. However, in the case of Spencer Kellogg
& Sons, Inc. v. United States,22 the Supreme Court refused to
confirm this interpretation of the law, and declared that it should
apply also to others. The purpose of the law is to prevent trans-
portation of property in interstate commerce at less than tariff
rates and it applies to any person or corporation whose designed
acts accomplish that result.
23
B. Tying Contracts
Tying contracts, so-called, are prohibited by the special pro-
vision of Section 3 of the Clayton Act,24 which states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a
sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, ma-
chinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented
or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale within the
United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of
'Supra note 17.
E270 U. S. 512, 46 Sup. Ct. 392 (1926).
220 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
'Cf. REP. ArT-'Y GEN. 1927, at 26; ibid. 1928, at 22.
2'Supra note 7, at 731, U. S. C., at § 14.
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a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where
the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement or understanding may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce".
The leading cases are those of United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co. 25  In these cases the defendant company leased
its machines under certain conditions which prohibited the lessees,
under penalty of having their rights to the use of the machines
withdrawn, from performing operations on these machines, where
the preliminary work had been done on machines of other manu-
facturers, and from using machines of other manufacturers
together with the machines of the defendant. The contracts which
the defendant company made tended toward a monopoly, as its
machines were absolutely essential to the lessees for the successful
functioning of their businesses. The contract clause in question
was declared void as an infringement of the Clayton Act. The
Court said:
"This system of 'tying' restrictions is quite as effective
as express covenants could be and practically compels the
use of the machinery of the lessor except upon risks which
manufacturers will not willingly incur".
26
In the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refin-
ing Co. 2 7 the Supreme Court declared the agreement, commonly
imposed by the large oil companies, to the effect that the lessees
of their tanks should only store therein oil delivered by them, to
be valid in so far as the lessee was not prohibited from renting
tanks from, or selling the oil of, other companies. But the agree-
ment between a seller and purchasers that the latter are prohibited
from reselling merchandise of other manufacturers, if the said
agreement results in essentially endangering free competition in
227 Fed. 507 (E. D. Mo. i915) (illegal leases); ibid. 234, Fed. 127 (E. D.
Mo. 1916 (constitutionality of the provisions as to leases in § 3 of the Clayton
Act); ibid. 264 Fed. 138 (E. D. Mo. I92O), aff'd, 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct.
363 (1922) (general construction of §3 of the Clayton Act).
' United Shoe Machine Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 458, 42 Sup.
Ct. 363, 365 (1922).
=261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct. 424 (1923).
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this merchandise, is considered an infringement of the Clayton
Act.
28
C. Price-cutting
Price-cutting is prohibited by Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
This section is aimed at the method, employed by large firms
before the passage of the Act, of combating competition in a
certain district by slashing prices therein, and later, after the
elimination of the competitors, re-introducing normal prices.
Apart from the Clayton Act, it is also forbidden in so far as it
comes within the Sherman Act, when used by combinations in
restraint of trade.
29
D. Rings (Agreements Not to Tender)
In the United States, rings are considered combinations in
restraint of trade, and consequently, not only is a ring unlawful
which excludes free competition and fixes prices, but also any
agreement which controls bidding at an auction.30
E. Maintenance of Resale Prices
The principles which the United States courts have devel-
oped on this subject are as follows: It is not essentially an unfair
method of competition under the anti-trust laws to refuse the
sale of an article if the buyers refuse to maintain the minimum
resale price fixed by the seller. As the Supreme Court has said:
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrain the long recognized right
of a trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he is to deal and, of course, he may
announce in advance the circumstances under which he will
refuse to sell". 31
'Fed. Trade Com. v. Standard Electric Mfg. Co., 5 Fed. Trade Com. Dec.
376 (1923); cf. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1928,
at 48 et seq. (regarding a tying contract in the radio industry).
21 Cf. the cases discussed in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION 1927, at 43 et seq.
I United States v. Swift & Co., _22 Fed. 529 (C. C. N. D. Il. 19o3) ; I88
Fed. 92 (N. D. Ill. IgII).
"United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307, 39 Sup. Ct 465, 468
(I9OO).
METHODS OF REGULATING UNFAIR COMPETITION 861
If, however, by means of an express or implied agreement
with purchasers, especially through a boycott of wholesale dealers
and middlemen who will not submit to such an agreement, a sys-
tem is created which functions as a restraint of trade or creates
a monopoly, there exists an "organized maintenance of uniform
prices" which will be considered an unfair method of competi-
tion.3 2  The Supreme Court has expressed this limitation in this
manner:
"He may not . . . go beyond the exercise of this
right, and by contracts of combination, express or implied,
unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of com-
merce in the channels of interstate trade".
33
In the case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons 3 4 an
agreement between a pharmaceutical company and its resale
dealers (including almost all such dealers in the United States)
to resell its products only at certain set prices in the wholesale
and retail trade was declared void as in restraint of trade. Like-
wise, in the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co.,', it was determined that the company had created
an artificial system which would assure the maintenance of resale
prices. The Court said:
"By these methods the company . . . is enabled to
prevent competition in their subsequent disposition by pre-
venting all who do not sell at resale prices fixed by it from
obtaining its goods".,6
On the other hand, in the Colgate case 3 the illegality of
the agreed resale prices was denied, because the retail dealer could
'Fed. Trade Com. v. Pacific States Paper Ass'n, supra note II.
'Fed. Trade Com. v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453, 42 Sup. Ct. I5O,
154 (1922) ; also see the REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIES OF
THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRicA, 57: "The truth is, the law adjusts itself to the
facts, not to logic. And the facts have seemed to require the suppression, in
the public interest, of concerted agreements or understandings with distributors
to maintain fixed prices, whereas in the view of the courts, the mere exercise
of the private right of refusal to deal with obnoxious parties does not threaten
to become an effective means of achieving standardized prices."
&220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911).
'Supra note 33.
= Ibid. at 456, 42 Sup. Ct., at I55.
reUnited States v. Colgate & Co., supra note 31.
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sell the articles he had bought at any price he wanted to, without
running any danger other than incurring the ill will of his seller,
who, for his part, could make use of his undoubted right to stop
further dealings.
In the case of Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. Fed. Trade
Com.38 the Supreme Court refused a certiorari where the Circuit
Court of Appeals had held the action of the defendant company
legal, because of the fact that it had had no systematic inspection
and employed no force in restraint of trade, but limited itself
to warning where retail prices were cut, and, in two instances
where price-cutting was continued, refused further deliveries.
"Such occasional instances", said the court, "do not constitute
unlawful or unfair methods of competition . . ." 3
Such a resale price system is also illegal in the case of a
patented article. However, the owner of the patent may, by
means of a license, obligate the licensee to resell the article manu-
factured under the license at a certain price.
40
In 1928 the Federal Trade Commission started an investiga-
tion to determine the benefit or injury of the maintenance of
resale prices from the point of view of the producer, the whole-
saler, the retailer, and the consumer. The investigation concerns
itself with the cost of production, premiums, and profits of the
purchasers and dealers in free as compared with restricted goods,
and all other questions connected therewith. The material col-
lected will serve as the basis of a report which will include the
question of maintenance of prices in the United States and cer-
tain foreign countries.4
S15 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), petition denied, 273 U. S. 759, 47
Sup. Ct. 473 (1927). See also the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 1927, at 79 et seq.; cf. the numerous decisions cited by THORNTON,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 1159, n. 182; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COm mIssION 1928, at 43, 67; Kobi v. Fed. Trade Corn., 23 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A.
2d, 1927).
'Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc., v. Fed. Trade Com., supra note 38, at 278.
" Boston Store v. American Gramophone Co., 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct 257
(1918) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. x92
(1926) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 244 Fed. I56 (C. C. A.
6th, I9'7).
'See ANNUAr. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CommissioN 1928 , 37 et
seq. The first part has appeared in the meantime under the title, "Resale Price
Maintenance", Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1929. Cf.
TscHIOWSCHKY, KARTELLRUNDSCHAU (1929) 22 et seq.
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F. Bogus Independents
Keeping secret, for the purpose of competition, the fact that
an apparently independent firm is in reality dependent, has been
held by the courts to be an illegal act. "The seller may let the
buyer cheat himself ad libitum", said a Federal court, "but must
not actively assist him in cheating himself." 42
III. ENGLISH LAW
The law in England concerning the regulation of unfair
competition is based entirely on the common law. Statutes which
previously applied to certain parts of the subject are no longer in
force.43  In order to form an opinion as to whether the typical
forms of competition herein treated are, according to English
law, legal or illegal, the attitude of the common law toward free-
dom of trade on the one hand, and freedom of contract on the
other, is of prime importance. This will answer the question
as to how far a specific restraint of trade is illegal and consequently
void, unenforcible, or even criminal.
44
The general rule of the common law is that a restraint of
trade will be held valid in so far as it is reasonable, i. e.-so long
as it is no greater than necessary to protect the justifiable interests
of the parties in question, and not against public policy. Ques-
tions of the validity of cartel agreements, their legal effect on
the parties thereto, and the validity of contractual obligations of
cartels on their members toward customers or suppliers, depend,
in every case, on whether the contract is reasonable and not against
public policy.
The following discussion will disclose to what extent meas-
ures adopted by a cartel against third parties, in regulation of
competition and not in the form of a contractual obligation, are
permitted.
' United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987, 992 (D. Minn.
1914), quoting I PARSON, CONTRACTS (gth ed. 1904) 615; see also cases cited in
DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAm Coi 1rsrioN (1916) (the Report of the
Federal Commissioner of Corporations) at 318 et seq., 465 et seq.
'This subject is more fully discussed in Kocir, GRUNDZfIGE DES ENG-
LISCHEN KARTELIEETS (1927).
" Ibid.
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A. Boycott
a. In England
The English law recognizes, in principle, the boycott as a
legal means of combating competition. Everyone has the right
to conduct his business according to his own ideas and as he deems
best, even though he thereby comes in conflict with the business
of another.
In the case of Ware and De Freville v. Motor Trade Assoc.45
the action of a dealer, boycotted for not maintaining the associa-
tion prices, against the associations for the purpose of being taken
off the blacklist, was defeated, the court saying, ". . . what
the defendant did . . . was done bona fide in protection of
their trade interests".
46
The leading case is that of Sorrel v. Smith,47 where the
House of Lords, after considering in detail the earlier cases of
Allen v. Flood 48 and Quinn v. Leathen,49 enunciated the ruling
principles of the common law. In this case the National Federa-
tion of Retail Newsagents, Booksellers, and Stationers, for the
purpose of combating newly-established outsiders, demanded that
a wholesaler boycott a designated outsider, and, upon refusal of
the demand, a boycott was instituted by the federation against
the wholesaler. Among the retail dealers who, because of this
boycott, had ceased business relations with the wholesaler, was
the plaintiff Sorrel, who changed to another wholesaler named
Watson. The committee of the circulation managers of the Lon-
don daily newspapers took up the matter to protect the boycotted
wholesaler, and threatened to boycott the wholesaler Watson, in
which threat the defendant Smith also joined, if Watson did not
stop his deliveries to Sorrel. Watson complied and Sorrel there-
upon brought an action against Smith to stop him from inter-
fering with Sorrel's business relations with Watson. The com-
plaint was dismissed on the ground that the concerted action of
[1gol] 3 K. B. 40.
4 Ibid. 62; Hardie and Lane v. Chilton, [1928] I K. B. 663.
[1925] A. C. 700.
[1898] A. C. I.
[igoi] A. C. 495.
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Smith and the committee of the managers operated to promote
the justifiable protection of the business of the newspaper pub-
lishers. The House of Lords announced the following rules of
law:
If an individual, even with the intention of injuring another,
commits an act legal in itself, he does not act illegally. But if
two or more commit the same act, with the intention of injuring
another, they are guilty of conspiracy and subject to damages.
If, however, the purpose of the cobperation of two or more
persons is not to injure a third party, but to promote or protect
the business of the parties to the contract, no illegal act is com-
mitted in so far as no illegal means, such as threats, duress, in-
ducement to breach of contract, etc., are employed.
Consequently, no cause of action arises except in the'case
of conspiracy or the employment of illegal means. A threat is
illegal if thereby an illegal act is threatened. A threat of boy-
cotting deliveries is legal. Inducement to breach a contract is
illegal; however, an inducement to terminate the contract in the
manner and time provided therein is permissible.
b. In Scotland
The rules of the Scottish law are similar to those just ex-
amined. In the case of Scottish Coiperative Wholesale Society,
Ltd. v. Glasgow Fleshers' Trade Defence Association ;0 the de-
fendant association informed the dealers that they would par-
ticipate only in those auctions in which the plaintiff's bids were
rejected. The dealers obeyed this mandate, published a corre-
sponding notice, and rejected the plaintiff's offers. The action
of the association against the dealers, demanding that the rejec-
tion of offers be stopped, and against the butchers association
for damages, was dismissed. The dealers were, in the opinion
of the court, entitled to reject offers from anybody they pleased.
The butchers did not act illegally when, by legal means, they
caused the buyers to pursue a given course which was itself legal.
10Scot. L. R. 645 (I898).
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c. In the Dominions
Here unfair competition is, in part, regulated by statutes
which deviate from the common law and approach the American
attitude.5' In Australia the Act for the Preservation of Aus-
tralian Industries and the Repression of Destructive Monopolies 52
is in force. This law was passed in 19o6, and was amended up
to 191o. By this Act, in business transactions which are carried
on beyond the borders of an individual state of the federation,
a monopoly or any other unfair method of competition which is
not reasonable or does not conform to public policy, especially a
boycott as to delivery, is illegal and punishable.
In interpreting the law, those principles are to be applied
which were laid down by the Privy Council in the criminal case
of Attorney General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co.53
In that case, an association of collieries and a steamship asso-
ciation entered into an exclusive contract under which the steam-
ship company had to sell the coal, which they had taken over at
fixed F. 0. B. prices, at C. I. F. terms. The judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, rendered under Section 4 (I) (a) of the Act,
54
and based upon the alleged intent of the defendant "to restrain
trade or commerce to the detriment of the public", was reversed
unanimously by the appellate court; and this reversal was later
affirmed by the Privy Council on the ground that there was no
intention on the part of the defendant to injure the public. The
United States rule -5 that the enforceability of the contract should
be a test of its legality was rejected. The court said:
". .: . the Act of 19o6 only deals with contracts or
combinations . . . which involve detriment to the pub-
lic and in which a sinister intention is of the essence of the
offence." 56
Supra p.
AUS ATR1m.A INDUSTRIES PROTECTION ACT (i906) (as amended by Acts
of i908, No. 5, I909, No. 26, i910, No. 29), §4 (I) (a).
[1913] A. C. 781. See Simpson, How Far Does the Law of England For-
bid Monopoly? (1925) 41 L. Q. REv. 406.
' AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIES PROTECTION ACT, loc. cit. supra note 52.
"Supra p.
'r Att'y Gen. of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co., supra note 53, at 8Ol.
METHODS OF REGULATING UNFAIR COMPETITION 867
New South-Wales has passed similar provisions against un-
fair measures of competition, in its Monopoly Act of I923." 7
In New Zealand, the Act for the Repression of Monopolies in
Trade or Commerce of i9io, by Section 4, makes every person
guilty of an offence
" . who either as principal or agent refuses, either
absolutely or except upon disadvantageous or relatively dis-
advantageous conditions, to sell or supply to any other per-
son or to purchase from any other person any goods for the
reason that the latter person-(a) deals, or has dealt, or
will deal, or intends to deal or has not undertaken or will not
undertake not to deal with any person or class of persons
either in relation to any particular goods or generally; or,
(b) is not, or has not been, or will not become or undertake
to become, or has not undertaken to become a member of a
Commercial Trust; or, (c) does not act, or has not acted, or
will not act, or does not intend to act, or has not undertaken
or will not undertake to act, in obedience to or in conformity
with the determinations, directions, suggestions or requests
of any Commercial Trust with respect to the sale, purchase,
or supply of any goods."
In Canada, under the Criminal Code,58 it is provided that:
"A conspiracy in restraint of trade is an agreement be-
tween two or more persons to do or procure to be done any
unlawful act in restraint of trade."
Under Section 498, everyone is guilty of an indictable offence
. . . who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with
any other person, or with any railway, steamship, steamboat
or transportation company-(a) to unduly limit the facilities
for transpbrting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, stor-
ing or dealing in any article or commodity which may be a
subject of trade or commerce. "
Under Section 2 of the Combines Investigation Act,59
any actual or tacit contract, agreement, arrange-
ment, or combination which has or is designed to have the
WNEW SouT: WAILFs STAT. (1923) 371.
as CRANKSHAW, CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA (5th ed. 1924) § 496.
STATUTES OF CANADA (1923) at p. 1g.
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effect of (I) limiting facilities for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing; or, (II) pre-
venting, limiting or lessening manufacture or production;
or, (III) fixing a common price or a resale price, or a com-
mon rental, or a common cost of storage or transportation;
or, (IV) enhancing the price, rental or cost of article, rental,
storage of transportation; or, (V) preventing or lessening
competition in, or substantially controlling within any par-
ticular area or district or generally, production, manufacture,
purchase, barter, sale, storage, transportation, insurance or
supply; or, (VI) otherwise restraining or injuring trade or
commerce.
is deemed a combine if it has operated, or is likely to operate, to
the detriment of, or against the interest of, the public.
In South Africa, the Board of Trade and Industries of the
Union of South Africa is engaged in investigating the effects of
cartels, especially in so far as they aim at the creation of
monopolies or the restraint of trade. According to the Custom
Tariff and Excise Duties Act of 1925, the Governor General has
the right to proceed against unfair measures of competition by
regulation of custom duties.
B. Deferred Rebates
In the case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow &
Co.60 a number of steamship companies agreed with one another
as to the number of ships to be sent to a certain port, the freight
to be charged and other matters. The companies informed their
customers that a certain rebate would be granted in the case of
exclusive use of their lines, and they forbade their agents, under
penalty of dismissal, to engage in any activity for other lines.
When the plaintiff, an outsider, sent ships to this port, the mem-
bers of the ring reduced their freight rates and increased the
number of ships. They forbade their agents to be of service to
the ships of the plaintiff and threatened their customers with
cancellation of rebates if plaintiff's ship were used. The plaintiff
was forced thereby to run its ships at a loss.
4023 Q. B. D. 598 (889), aff'd, [1892] A. C. 25.
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This case contained a number of measures for regulating
competition-boycott, deferred rebates, and price-cutting-all of
which were declared by the court to be fair. Lord Esher, dis-
senting, declared that the action of the steamship companies "is
a thing done not in the due course of trade, and is therefore an
act wrongful . . . and is also wrongful against the right
of the public to have free competition against traders
and, if it is carried out and injury ensues, is actionable"."' The
other judges, however, declared:
"If peaceable and honest combinations of capital
are to be struck at, it must . . . be by legislation, for
I do not see that they are under the ban of the common
law." 62
"I know no limits to the right of competition in the
defendants-I mean, no limits in law. I am not speaking
of morals or good manners. To draw a line between fair
and unfair competition, between what is reasonable and un-
reasonable, passes the power of the Courts." 03
In the dominions, the special statutes, to which reference
has been made, are in force. 4 In Australia, the granting of re-
bates is forbidden by the Australian Industries Preservation Act:
"Any person who in relation to trade or commerce with
other countries or among the States, either as principal or
agent, in respect of dealing in any goods or services gives,
offers or promises to any other person any rebate, refund,
discount, concession or reward for the reason or upon the
condition express or implied that the latter person (a) deals,
or has dealt, or will deal, or intends to deal exclusively with
any person either in relation to any particular goods or
services or generally; (b) deals, or has dealt, or will deal,
or intends to deal exclusively with members of a commercial
trust either in relation to any particular goods or services
or generally; or, (c) does not deal, or has not dealt, or will
not deal, or does not intend to deal with certain persons
either in relation to any. particular goods or services or gen-
"Ibid. 61o.
Ibid. 620.
"3 Ibid. 626.
" Supra notes 52, 57, 58, 59.
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erally; or, (d) is or becomes a member of a commercial
trust, is guilty of an offence (penalty 500 English
pounds) ".65
In New Zealand, under Section 3 of the Commercial Act of
i91o, every person is guilty of an offense,
. . . who, either as principal or as agent, in respect of
dealings in any goods, gives, offers or agrees to give to any
other person any rebate, refund, discount, concession, allow-
ance, reward or other valuable consideration for the reason,
or upon the express or implied condition, that the latter per-
son . . . undertakes, or has undertaken, or will under-
take to deal exclusively or principally with any person or class
of persons, or becomes, or has been, or has undertaken, or
will undertake to become a member of a Commercial Trust".
C. Tying Contracts
In contrast to the law of the United States, where a restraint
of trade was found in the shoe machine case 16 when the manu-
facturers of shoe-making machines, by a so-called "tying" clause,
obligated their purchasers to refrain from using any machines of
their competitors in their factories during the twenty years for
which the contract was to run, the English courts have declared
such a provision to be valid.6 7 While the lower courts in Canada
recognized the plea of restraint of trade as sufficient in an action
brought to enforce such a contract, the Privy Council reversed
the decision of the lower court, and decided against the defendant,
saying:
"By virtue of the privilege which the law secures to
all traders, namely, that they shall be left free to conduct
their own trade in the manner which they deem best for
their own interests, so long as that manner is not in itself
illegal, the respondents are at liberty to hire or not to hire
the appellants' machines as they choose, irrespective
altogether of the injury their refusal to deal may inflict on
others. The same privilege entitles the appellants to dispose
of the products they manufacture on any terms not in them-
S ipra note 52, § 7 (a).
'United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., s=Pra note 25.
' 7United Shoe Machinery Co. of Canada v. Brunet, [i9og] A. C. 330.
METHODS OF REGULATING UNFAIR COMPETITION 871
selves illegal, or not to dispose of their products at all, as
they may deem best in their own interest, irrespective of the
like consequences. This privilege is, indeed, the very essence
of that freedom of trade in the name and in the interest of
which the respondents claim to escape from the obligations
of their contracts".
68
Mr. Simpson attacks this decision because it does not suffi-
ciently consider whether the restraint of trade contained in the
contract was unreasonable and injurious to the public. He says:
"If a combine can enforce a contract like this, the doc-
trine of restraint of trade hardly applies to combines at all".
69
In the Dominions of the British Empire tying contracts, as
in the United States, are subject to the previously-mentioned laws,
prohibiting them as in restraint of trade or as a monopoly. In
the report of the Board of Trade in South Africa, it is stated:
"Generally speaking, however, it should be evident that
there is nothing fraudulent or unethical in this practice.
That this policy is subject to abuse and may lead to undue
restraint of competitive trade, is not to be denied, but the
determination of unfairness and undue restraints detrimental
to public interest is a matter for careful consideration of
the detailed circumstances in each case". 70
D. Price-cutting
In the case of Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor
Gow & Co.,71 the English judges declared the reduction of rates
in combating outsiders and forcing them to run their ships at a
loss to be permissible. The Board of Trade of South Africa
has also, in the report already mentioned, concerned itself with
this question. It came to the following conclusion:
"At best, public policy is seriously concerned whenever
misrepresentation in connection with this price-policy takes
'Ibid. 342.
' Simpson, op. cd., ufpra note 53, at 406; REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TADE
OF SOUTHr AF1'1CA (igig) (Report of the Committee on Trusts) 27 ct seq.
' Ibid. 7, 8.
' Sipra note 6o.
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place, especially whenever this policy is designed as a tem-
porary measure to drive out competition and gain monop-
olistic control with intent to raise prices in order to
recuperate previous losses." 72
In addition, the report stated:
"If it can be proved that respondents are attempting
to destroy or oust their competitors with intent to set up a
complete monopoly, the board would also have surer grounds
for recommending interference".
7 3
Sir John McDonall, who has come to the conclusion that
systematic cutting of rates, in order to combat competition, is not
illegal, stating:
"Upon this point there have been in England great
differences in judicial opinion but since the decision of the
House of Lords in Allan v. Flood and Quinn v. Leathem
the law appears to be that, whatever may be the motive of
the person carrying on unfair competition, no action will lie
in the absence of injury in the legal sense." 74
nevertheless finds that the English courts, in taking this position
are inconsistent with their attitude in other decisions combating
monopolies, for the reason that "they have legalized what is in
practice the most effective mode of destroying competition and
creating a monopoly, i. e.-under-cutting and other devices for
destroying rivals in trade".
7 5
E. Rings (Agreements Not to Tender)
In the case of Johns v. North 6 four firms engaged in sell-
ing bricks entered into an agreement whereby A should make the
most favorable bid to a company which had requested offers, and
A, at the same time, obligated himself to purchase a certain quan-
tity of bricks from the other parties to the agreement, B, C, and
' REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON TRUSTS, supra note 69, 4.
"Ibid. 23.
U McDonall, Notes as to the Law Relating to Combinations (igig) (pub-
lished by the Committee on Trusts).
Ibid.
78L. R. i Eq. 426 (1875).
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D. The latter, on their part, agreed not to sell any bricks to the
company in question for a certain number of years. B breached
the contract and made a bid which was accepted. A was success-
ful in an action brought to prohibit delivery to the company be-
cause the contract, considering the interests of the parties thereto,
was held to be reasonable and consequently valid.
In the same way, in conformity with the earlier decision, it
was held in Rawlings v. General Trading Co.,77 that an agree-
ment among several persons not to bid against one another at a
public auction was not illegal.
F. Maintenance of Resale Prices
In the case of Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son,
Ltd.78 certain manufacturers sold goods to wholesalers upon the
condition that they should not be resold under a certain price and
that the wholesaler, in reselling, must impose upon his purchaser
certain minimum reselling prices. A wholesale dealer sold the
goods to a retail dealer without requiring the latter to obligate
himself to resell only at the prescribed retail minimum price. An
action for damages brought by the manufacturer against the
wholesaler was successful. The court said:
"Why should the [plaintiff] not be at liberty to make
the further bargain with . . . [defendants] that they
shall not sell it below a certain price? It is said that it is
in restraint of trade. In one sense it is, but it is just as
much and no more in restraint of trade for plaintiff to say
that they will not sell at all. It seems to me that what is
restraint of trade as regards [defendants] is really the liberty
of trades as regards [plaintiffs] ".79
On this subject the committee on Trusts states:
"One of the most important phases of restraint of trade
is the practice of resale price maintenance, particularly in
the case of proprietory articles. In Great Britain this prac-
tice is practically universal and is sponsored by the Pro-
= [I921] i K. B. 635.
[x9oi] 2 Ch. 275.
SIbid. 279.
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prietory Articles Trade Association. This practice is also
good in law and recently, in so far as this practice is engaged
in by trade associations or combinations, the English Court
of Appeal has more or less consistently upheld this form of
associational protection of private interest".80
The case of National Phonograph Company, Ltd. v. Edison
Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co., Ltd.s - was an action by a
manufacturer against a retail dealer for damages and an injunc-
tion. The latter had purchased goods from a middleman, who
was bound by contract to sell the goods at certain agreed resale
prices, on terms and at prices which constituted a breach of the
agreement of the middlemen with the plaintiff. The Chancery
Division dismissed the complaint. The judge did not discuss
the question whether the price agreement in question constituted
an illegal restraint of trade. The court stated that the complaint
was not well founded, because the plaintiff had suffered no dam-
age; and the mere fact that the defendant had bought goods at
less than the agreed prices was not an inducement to a breach
of contract that would render the defendant liable in damages,
provided there was no positive interference with the contractual
relations between the plaintiff and anyone else. The question
whether a breach of contract is actionable depends on the nature
of the contract broken.
In the British Dominions agreements as to resale prices are
forbidden by the statutes against monopolies and commercial
trusts.
12
G. Bogus Independents
The maintenance of "bogus independents" by a trust, for
the purpose of camouflage is in principle permitted. It is only
when this arrangement is abused and falsely used to deceive the
public, or for the purpose of unfair competition and unreasonable
restraint of trade, that it becomes reprehensible and detrimental
to the public interest.8 3
"I REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRUSTS, supra note 69, at 55.
'96 T. L. R. 218 (i9o6).
8 See statutes cited supro notes 52, 58, 59, 65.
8
3Supra note 69.
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IV. SUMMARY
A comparison of the principles of law in the field of regula-
tion of unfair competition in Germany, England, and the United
States shows the following results:
In the United States the division present in German law
between the private side of this problem of unfair competition
and the public economic problem of cartels is not known. United
States law considers as unfair methods of competition not only
the private measures of open competition such as misrepresenta-
tion, deceiving, etc., which are contra bonos mores, but also those
measures which, from the viewpoint of public policy, under
special statutes, are deemed illegal because they militate against
open competition, and consequently act in restraint of trade by
tending toward monopoly.
German law does not consider acts which materially restrict
open competition to be fundamentally unfair. It requires the
permission of the Cartel Court only in the case of a boycott or
similar measure under Section 9 of the Cartel Order; and only
in the absence of such permission is a tort committed. Further,
in accordance with Sections 4 and IO of the Cartel Order, the
Reichswirtschaftsminister has the right to move the Cartel Court
to declare void, (ar ro) allow parties to withdraw from, or re-
scind, the contracts and agreements of cartels, or the business
terms, or the manner of fixing prices of firms or associations
of firms, there public policy or the general welfare require it. On
the other hand, United States law considers every act, the tendency
of which might be to lessen substantially open competition unfair
and illegal.A4 The differences between the United States and the
German legal points of view are consequently fundamental and
extremely far-reaching.
According to the English law, (in the Dominions the law
of regulating competition is frequently embodied in statutes in
accordance with the United States point of view), methods of
", Our type of civilization has been based upon the principle of competition.
rhat principle has been embodied in our law not as a rule of business conduct,
but as a philosophy of human relationship." W. J. Donovan, former Assistant
Att'y Gen., at the Annual Convention of the National Paint, Oil and Varnish
Ass'n, Oct. 28, 1927.
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combating competition are in themselves fair, and only constitute
a tort when illegal means, such as intimidation, coercion, or con-
spiracy are employed. The German method of considering the
matter from an economic point of view, quite apart from the
problem of unfair competition as being contra bonos mores, and
of submitting problems of that nature, not to the ordinary courts
which concern themselves only with unfair competition, but to
the special cartel court, is unknown in English law."
The principle that restraint of trade is invalid in so far as
it is either unreasonable or against public policy, is applied only
to such measures of combating competition as arise from con-
tractual agreements among members of a cartel, customers, or
suppliers. It is not applied to measures taken against third par-
ties, or against customers and third parties, in execution of a
cartel agreement which in itself is in restraint of trade, but which
is nevertheless performed by the parties thereto.
The recognition of the fundamental fairness of measures
taken against third parties, and the refusal of the courts to con-
cern themselves with such measures, in the absence of statutory
authorization, is clearly expressed in the Mogul case. 86 Here
the court refused to decide upon the fairness or unfairness of
measures of such a character, or to consider whether they were
moral or immoral, but stated that consideration of their unfair-
ness of immorality, so far as their legality is concerned, must be
left to the legislature. Agreeing with this policy, McDonnal, in
his report of the Trust Committee,87 expresses the opinion that
the ordinary courts are not competent to decide such questions,
since a decision of such cases involves the solution of difficult
economic problems.
' In the Financial Times of Oct. 22, 1928, the author of an article entitled
Governments and Cartels, Contrast in National Attitudes, motivated, apparently,
by industrial considerations, takes a stand against the assumed right of the
Reichszwrtschaftsininster and the Cartel Court in Germany to attack, in the
administration of their duties, existing contracts. The author neglects to
mention the position taken in the Report of the Committee on Trusts (Igig),
which was quite contrary to his, and concludes his criticism of the German
situation with the words: "After making all allowances, the situation remains
one to which business men in this country have difficulty in accustoming them-
selves".
'Supra note 6o.
'Sispra note 69.
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In contrast to the United States system, which in its intensity
in combating measures of competition deemed fundamentally un-
fair is far superior to the German law (which at least, however,
under the Cartel Order, considers the general economic situation,
and, under the Civil Code, in certain narrowly-defined circum-
stances, recognizes measures as contra bonos mores), the English
law considers contracts in restraint of trade, which are reasonable
and not against public policy, as well as measures of competition,
even though directed by a combination against third parties, to
be fair so long as there is no conspiracy nor use of other illegal
means.
The following summary gives a comparative view of the
legal situations of the various forms of regulating competition in
the three countries.
A. Boycott
(i) In the United States a boycott is permitted only in so
far as it amounts to a purely business measure in refusing a cus-
tomer. It is illegal, especially, if it arises out of an agreement
of several firms, or serves monopolistic purposes, or is a method
of controlling competition.
(2) In Germany a boycott by a cartel is prohibited accord-
ing to Section 9 of the Cartel Order, unless the Cartel Court has
given its permission. This permission cannot be granted if the
general economic interests or the economic freedom of the party
against whom it is directed is thereby endangered.
The boycott is considered an immoral, bnd consequently
illegal, act if its exclusive purpose is to hurt the other party or
to injure him to an extent in excess of the advantages to be gained
thereby, or if its purpose is to force the other party to perform
an illegal act or to prevent him from performing a legal one.
(3) In England the boycott is without reserve, and is per-
mitted as long as it does not employ illegal means or amount to
a criminal conspiracy, i. e.-the combination of several persons
for the sole purpose of injuring another, and without profit to
themselves. The employment of the boycott by an individual as
a means of revenge, which would make the boycott immoral in
Germany, is permitted in England.
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B. Rebates
(i) In the United States rebates are prohibited by Section
2 of the Clayton Act as a price discrimination, in so far as they
are used as a means of eliminating competition.
(2) In Germany a rebate may, under certain circumstances,
constitute a measure similar to a boycott, and therefore be for-
bidden, if without the permission of the Cartel Court. Funda-
mentally, rebates, even when "deferred", do not constitute im-
moral measures against third parties, as they serve the promotion
of legal mercantile interests and do not lose their character of
fair measures of competition merely because they also touch the
sphere of interests of third parties.
(3) In England rebates are fair and legal.88
C. Tying Contracts
(i) In the United States tying contracts are forbidden by
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
(2) In Germany they are permitted in principle, but may
constitute a boycott under certain circumstances, and be immoral
because they oppress the other party to an extent which is out
of proportion to the advantages afforded thereby. The Cartel
Court gives the Reichswirtschaftsminister the power to declare
such contracts void for reasons of public policy and to make them
invalid by giving the parties the right to withdraw from them.
(3) In England, according to the decisions thus far, tying
contracts are upheld. Whether this is in accord with the prin-
ciple of the unenforceability of a contract in restraint of trade
may be doubtful in certain cases.
D. Price-cutting
(i) In the United States price-cutting is forbidden by Sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act, as a measure to prevent free competi-
tion and because of its monopolistic tendencies.
(2) In Germany it is allowed in principle, in so far as it
does not constitute a boycott requiring Court permission, or is
' Supra note 6o.
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not immoral because of the lower wages which must be paid for
the labor employed in the production of the articles.
(3) In England price-cutting is permitted.
E. Rings (Agreements Not to Tender)
(i) In the United States agreements not to tender are for-
bidden as in restraint of trade.
(2) In Germany they are allowed in so far as not immoral
because of unjustifiable advantages derived by reason of prices
being exorbitantly raised thereby.
(3) In England they are allowed if reasonable and not
against public policy.
F. Maintenance of Resale Prices
(i) In the United States maintenance of resale prices is
permitted only if falling within an agreement of a single trans-
action; it is not allowed if it goes beyond this and is to be secured
by special measures and through organized cooperation with
others.
(2) In Germany it is permitted by the ordinary courts in so
far as it is not considered immoral because of exorbitant raising
of prices, unlimited exploitation of a monopoly, etc.
The Cartel Court, on the other hand, attempts, when called
upon to give its permission to the declaration of a boycott against
a recalcitrant third party, to enforce the rule of public policy
against the maintenance of resale prices.
(3) In England it is permitted.
G. Bogus Independents
(i) In the United States bogus independents are forbidden
as being contrary to the purpose of the anti-trust laws prohibiting
monopolies.
(2) In Germany they are allowed, in so far as the deceit
practiced on the public, in individual cases, is not immoral.
(3) In England the law is similar to that of Germany.
